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Abstract: Gilbert Plumer has recently argued in his Plumer 2017 that psychologi-
cally rich novels offer the reader an opportunity to draw a transcendental inference:
what seems to us believable about the psychology of the characters, can be inferred
to be actually true about real human psychology. We propose, first, to disambiguate
a key term of art in Plumer’s argument, ‘believable’. Given that disambiguation,
the empirically contingent nature of one of Plumer’s premises comes into view. We
raise two main lines of empirically-motivated debunking arguments against that
premise, drawing particularly upon the psychological literatures about processing
fluency, and the illusion of explanatory depth. We then conclude with some fur-
ther implications for naturalistic approaches to aesthetics, and the relevance of
such debunking arguments.
I. INTRODUCTION: PLUMER’S TRANSCENDENTAL
ARGUMENT
Fictional narratives are thought, in Shakespeare’s words, to ‘hold . . . the mir-
ror up to nature’, revealing to ourselves something about ourselves – despite
the fact they largely concern people who never existed and events that never
occurred. How, and indeed whether, they do this has been a ripe topic for
philosophical and empirical investigation.1 And as we learn more about how
novels achieve this, we may find they do not offer such clear reflections of hu-
man nature – showing us ourselves at best ‘through a glass darkly’, to pivot
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from Hamlet to St. Paul. Such a discovery would debunk the claim that novels
mirror us. Debunking arguments take empirical premises about how we form
beliefs and undermine the justificatory status of the beliefs in question. Our
topic is the application of debunking arguments to novels’ claims to reveal
human nature. We start by discussing Plumer’s recent proposal that novels
have cognitive value – they reveal to us something about psychological reality
– by expressing transcendental arguments.2 We then outline the scheme of
what we call ‘aesthetic debunking arguments’, providing two candidate argu-
ments for how recent work in empirical psychology can call into question the
soundness of any novel’s transcendental argument. We conclude with some
methodological implications for aesthetics from debunking arguments.
In his ‘The Transcendental Argument of the Novel’, Gilbert Plumer argues
that fictional stories as fictions can teach us something new about the world.
On his analysis, fictional narratives as a whole can express an argument, and
we grasp this argument in experiencing the narrative as believable. Believ-
ability is not the same thing as realism.3 An episode of Star Trek: The Next
Generation may be believable even though it features technologies, like the
warp-drive, that violate of the laws of physics, and creatures, like androids
and aliens, unknown to modern science. What makes an episode of Star Trek
believable is how the characters like Commander Data behave and think. (Or,
if the android Data does not in fact think, we might say believability tracks
how we can’t help but think he must think.) Our sense of believability latches
on to the psychologies of the characters, not to other features of the fictional
world. As we emphasise below, this sense is part of our experience of the art-
work, which we naturally slip into attributing as a property to the artwork as
a whole. On Plumer’s analysis, this experience has cognitive value, expressed
by the transcendental argument of the novel.
A novel’s argument is transcendental in a specifically Kantian sense. Tran-
scendental arguments in the Kantian vein show that certain conditions must
obtain for us to experience the world as we do.4 For us to experience a novel
as believable, Plumer argues, it must be the case that we experience the
novel as ‘expressing’ or ‘embodying’ principles of human psychology, action,
or society that we believe obtain in the real world.5 As Plumer presents it, a
novel’s transcendental argument has the following form.6
(1) This novel is believable.
(2) This novel is believable only if principles p operate in the real
world.
(3) Therefore, principles p operate in the real world.
The Kantian twist occurs in (2). Our experience of believability tracks cer-
tain features of the novel, ignoring others: we might experience Frodo Bag-
gins’ decision to keep the One Ring at the Cracks of Doom as believable,
even though that decision results from the Ring’s malevolent but seductive
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promise of power to its bearers, which is decidedly fantastical. Those narra-
tive elements eliciting this sense of believability generate the transcendental
argument. Those elements, taken together, have cognitive value in that we
learn something about the world by experiencing them as believable. Plumer
argues that for us to experience part of the narrative as believable, and for
us to be correct that these parts are believable, those parts must somehow
express principles of human nature we already intuitively grasp as true. Read-
ers might not be able to reflectively articulate these principles: that difficult
task often falls to the literary critic, who uncovers and articulates principles
expressed in the work as a whole.7 ‘The novel’s transcendental argument is
there’, Plumer writes, ‘whether or not anybody notices’.8 The transcendental
argument of the novel elicits these shared assumptions, making them possible
objects of reflective knowledge.
Plumer doesn’t do so himself, but we can appreciate how this works by
comparing our grasp of truths of human nature with linguistic competence.
All native English speakers can recognise that Chomsky’s semantically non-
sensical sentence, ‘Colorless green ideas sleep furiously’, is grammatical. Few
native speakers can explain why that sentence is grammatical. One use of
stimulus sentences like Chomsky’s is that they elicit rules speakers intuitively
grasp, enabling linguists to formally analyse the structure of those rules. Nov-
els, according to Plumer, function much like Chomsky’s stimulus sentence.
From the latter we can learn much about syntax, even when the semantic con-
tent has no connection to reality. Similarly, novels can teach us about human
nature even when the narrative concerns physical or biological impossibili-
ties. When we experience fictional narratives as believable, those narratives
engage with principles of human nature we already intuitively, if implicitly,
grasp. We express our grasp of those principles by experiencing the novel as
believable, much like we express our grasp of syntactical rules in judging sen-
tences grammatical. The reader’s or literary critic’s task of clarifying why we
experience the novel as believable is much like the linguist’s task of inducing
and then explicitly representing those syntactic rules. We complete this task
by working through the transcendental argument of the novel.
The form of a transcendental arguments, as described above, is trans-
parently valid, as an instance of modus ponens. But we are concerned that
the reading of ‘believable’ that makes premise (1) highly plausible at the
same time renders premise (2) contentious, and more empirically fraught than
Plumer perhaps realises. Let’s distinguish between experiential and objective
readings of that term, which could be glossed as something like, ‘experienced
by the reader as psychologically plausible’ and ‘factually accurate in its por-
trayal of ways real human agents actually would act, in such circumstances’. It
seems that Plumer generally has the experiential reading in mind, e.g., when
he describes believability as a ‘simple, unanalysed measure of the novel’.9 Yet
rewritten with that reading made explicit, the resulting second premise no
longer looks so intuitive:
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(1’) This novel is experienced by the reader as psychologically
plausible.
(2’) This novel is experienced by the reader as psychologically
plausible only if principles p operate in the real world.
(3) Therefore, principles p operate in the real world.
That is not to say that (2’) is anything like counter-intuitive – it just makes
it usefully clear that it is an empirical claim, linking a kind of experience
of the novel on the one hand with objectively true principles of psychology
on the other. We would parse that connection between reader’s experience
and human psychological nature into two major links. First, the experience of
believability must track some sort of actual psychological reality. Second, that
psychological reality must be something that can be appropriately represented
in terms of principles, which can then be realised and articulated, perhaps
with varying degrees of reliability, by readers or critics. Let’s call the former
the reflection thesis (RT) and the latter (at perhaps some risk of confusion)
the principle thesis (PT). The RT gets you from experienced believability to
psychological reality, and the PT tells you that that reality is well expressed
as principles – just what (2’) requires.
Plumer does not really consider the PT thesis explicitly, beyond reject-
ing any sort of Churchlandian eliminativism.10 He perhaps takes it to be
beyond argument that any such psychological reality must be of a sort that
can properly be translated into some sort of general, universal propositions.11
We won’t pursue the point much here, though we would note that it is not
an empirically innocent presupposition. It may be that our folk psychological
competence is not, after all, so much a matter of internalised, implicit prin-
ciples à la Chomskyan rules of grammar, but more like a grab-bag of tricks
and hacks that allow us to do a generally adequate job of coordinating our
behaviours. For example, Matthew Ratcliffe has argued that many of these
tricks – mutual gaze and use of facial expressions, among others – ‘operate
through [real-time interpersonal] interaction and are not internalised abilities
that precede it’.12 Interpersonal understanding does not result, on his analy-
sis, from the application of general principles to specific circumstances. Nor
could that understanding be translated into a set of propositions, as partic-
ular features of the second-personal interactive context are what constitute
that understanding as an unfolding dynamic between conversational partners.
Should the PT be false – as Ratcliffe’s work suggests – (2’) would be false,
and the transcendental argumentative form unsound.13
We will focus instead on the RT, which Plumer is concerned to defend at
some length, and on largely evolutionary grounds. His argument runs roughly
thus: Our evolutionarily honed psychological competence in mind reading un-
derwrites this experience of believability. Humans have lived for thousands
of generations in small communities where survival and flourishing requires
predicting and understanding others’ behaviour. We do this by attributing to
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others mental states – beliefs, desires, and intentions – on the basis of what
they say and do to formulate these predictions, the veracity of which signifi-
cantly determined our ancestors’ reproductive success. As a result of sharing
this evolved competence, ‘we share a significant set of fundamental assump-
tions about human nature’.14 Of this shared set of fundamental assumptions,
Plumer notes, ‘[t]here is no alternative possible explanation of their existence
and entrenchment other than that they have evolved in answer to millions
of years of human needs’.15 These shared assumptions could not have served
human needs of predicting others’ behaviour unless they were ‘on the whole
reflective of reality’.16 So, on Plumer’s analysis, we approach a novel already
having mastered key facts about human psychology, and our mastery of those
facts is manifest in our experiences of believability.
Granting arguendo that there is an underlying psychological reality, and
that as per PT it is capturable in terms of principles at least sometimes, how
can transcendental arguments go wrong? Novels hold our interest by placing
characters in unusual situations, including those totally unknown to our an-
cestors in the environment of evolutionary adaptiveness (EEA) that shaped
our competence in mind reading. For several hundred thousand years our
ancestors lived at subsistence-level in small forager bands, gradually tran-
sitioning to subsistence farming some ten to fifteen thousand years ago.17
Only in the past few hundred years has economic growth freed the majority
of humans from a grinding concern with day-to-day survival.18 Setting aside
outliers like Robinson Crusoe (or Clan of the Cave Bear), the overwhelming
majority of novels place their characters in environments profoundly differ-
ent from that of the EEA, where it was a daily pressing concern to satisfy
nutritional needs. Our distant ancestors dealt with problems of social class
and courtship, and we would not deny the social world of Pride and Prej-
udice, say, bears some similarities to those of the EEA. But the differences
between the two are extreme. It hardly follows that an evolved competence
finely attuned to features of the ancestral environment will remain a reliable
predictor of behaviour under industrialised non-subsistence conditions that
are, in evolutionary terms, completely new. Thus we reject (2’) as being in
any way a truth that should be obvious from the armchair.
Going forward, we offer empirical grounds for doubting (2’) by debunking
the intuitive sense of believability. Just to be clear, our objective is not to
show that (2’) is false, but merely that it stands as an open empirical question,
and cannot be presupposed for the purposes of arguments like Plumer’s. Our
main argument here will suggest that our sense of psychological plausibility
may not be as reliable a guide to human nature as Plumer’s transcendental
argument requires.
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II. AESTHETIC DEBUNKING ARGUMENTS & THE
FALLIBILITY OF OUR AESTHETIC SENSIBILITIES
In “Aesthetic Debunking Arguments”, we offer an initial survey of the prospects
for aesthetic debunking arguments, in which learning about the nature of the
psychological processes underlying our aesthetic engagements threatens to di-
minish our satisfaction in those engagements.19 One such form of debunking
we consider there regards authorial techniques to gin up an impression of
truthful realism:
Consider James Wood’s argument in How Fiction Works that
writers including Balzac and Flaubert in the 19th century wrote in
a realist style by, among other things, filling their fictions with de-
tails seemingly unnecessary to advancing the plot. For example,
Emma Bovary doesn’t simply touch satin slippers, but slippers
‘the soles of which were yellowed with wax from the dance floor.’
This accumulation of detail gives the novel a ‘truthful’ feel, which,
for some readers, may lead them to treat the novel as a source of
truth about the actual world: say, about the monotony of mar-
riage, in the case of Madame Bovary. In this case, we come to
acquire a belief . . . through the process of experiencing a realist
narrative – despite the fact that this realism is just a stylistic trick
of Flaubert’s. Surely, the accumulation of unnecessary details in
a prose work has nothing to do with that work’s ability to convey
deep truths about the actual world.20
In this example, should we come to believe that our impression of veridi-
cality in Madame Bovary may be merely the consequence of a Flaubertian
layering on of details, we may find ourselves appropriately less inclined to
credit the apparent insights of the novel. (We may also find ourselves valuing
our experience of the novel accordingly less as well, although questions of
aesthetic value are mostly not the topic here.)
Borrowing our argument schema from Nichols 2014 and Kumar and May
2019 debunking arguments have the following form for a belief B and a cog-
nitive process P.
(D1) B is based mainly on P. (empirical premise)
(D2) P is epistemically defective. (normative premise)
(D3) So, B is unjustified.
Debunking arguments have a clear application to Plumer’s transcendental
argument schema, once we acknowledge his (2’) presupposes the truth of the
RT, which is itself an empirical claim. When we believe Madame Bovary
reveals aspects of psychological reality on the basis of our experiencing it
as believable, that experience of believability has a certain etiology in the
reading experience. Sound transcendental arguments require that this eti-
ology results from epistemically reliable processes for forming beliefs about
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psychological reality. One species of aesthetic debunking arguments uncovers
the actual cognitive processes generating the relevant belief (D1), and then
shows these processes to be unreliable belief-forming mechanisms (D2). Aes-
thetic debunking arguments show our beliefs in propositions about the world,
which the novel purportedly reveals as true, to be unjustified – insofar as
those beliefs rely for their justification on the reading experience.
Now, as already noted above, believability and realism are distinct charac-
teristics, and we are not suggesting that the exact same concern from Wood
will apply to Plumer’s argument. Nonetheless, it opens the door to what
we take to be the right kind of question to ask, in considering Plumer’s RT:
what kinds of potentially misleading cues, nudges, or heuristics might drive
our impressions of believability, such that a novel may be experienced by a
reader as psychologically plausible, when the portrayal of human agency is,
in fact, either inaccurate tout court, or when we are unjustified in deeming
it either objectively plausible or implausible? In short, how might the expe-
riential and objective notions of plausibility come unstuck from each other,
where novels can give rise to the former without truly possessing the latter?
Before we try to articulate a few such candidate ways in which these
notions can become unstuck, we would offer two caveats about what we take
the rules of the dialectic to be here. First, we are not affirming that any of
these hypotheses are true, or even more likely to be true than the RT. Our
objective is only to show that the RT is not as empirically trivial as Plumer
hopes, and that it does not follow as trivially as he would like from broad
evolutionary considerations. Second, however, it’s not enough for us to just
make up some merely metaphysically or logically or conceptually possible
scenario. We take it that our hypotheses need not be shown to be true,
but nonetheless they need to be empirically live, and consonant with good
scientific evidence.
III. DON’T BELIEVE EVERYTHING THAT SEEMS
BELIEVABLE: PROCESSING FLUENCY
In this section and the next, we identify two ways, well-motivated by the
empirical literature, in which the RT can turn out false, causing the tran-
scendental argument scheme to be unsound. First we consider how our sense
of the psychological believability of characters in novels is subject to distor-
tion from the cue of processing fluency. Next we consider how the illusion of
explanatory depth could drive literary critics to unjustifiably treat believable
fictional characters as instantiating general truths of human nature.
The cue of processing fluency turns on our feeling of how easily a well-
wrought narrative is to follow, digest, and enjoy. Contrast the feeling of how
easy it is to read a phrase when written in a simple sans-serif font, contrasted
with one written in a more challenging script-like font. That feeling turns
out to enter into a large number of cognitive transactions, and our minds
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recruit that feeling as a cue that, roughly speaking, things are going well
– that feeling of easy thought is used as a positive heuristic for all sorts of
evaluation. The fluency heuristic has a distinct, and sometimes significantly
stronger, influence over what we choose in, say, consumption bundles, than
do the actual substantive features of the selected options.21 While, as you
might imagine, there is a vast literature on these effects in the consumer
choice literature, it has also been of interest in more aesthetic domains as
well. For example, increasing feelings of fluency can augment the humour
of a joke.22 Moreover, processing fluency has been hypothesised to explain
the ‘mere exposure effect’, in which people’s preferences for one painting or
another can be manipulated by their simply having seen the preferred one
more often in the past;23 though see Meskin et al 2013, and Liao and Meskin
(this issue) for some recent aesthetics x-phi that complicates that story.24
Processing fluency has even been posited as playing a central role in aesthetic
responses such as judgments of beauty, though this is perhaps still more
conjectural than many other psychological effects of fluency.25
Given our topic here, we are interested not so much in forming preferences
or making choices, as we are in judgments about what is true or false. And
indeed fluency can play a substantial role in our metacognitive evaluation
of how true some message is, how credible the argument, how trustworthy
the source.26 A lovely illustration is that aphorisms that rhyme – and are
thus phonologically fluent – are perceived as more insightful than aphorisms
that do not; e.g., ‘Woes unite foes’ vs. ‘Woes unite enemies’).27 In a classic
review paper, Alter and Oppenheimer write: ‘If the experience of fluency is
important regardless of the associated content, then the ease or difficulty as-
sociated with a broad range of cognitive processes should have similar effects
on judgment. Indeed, Schwarz later noted that, ‘theoretically, any . . . variable
that increases processing fluency should have the same effect’.28 Supporting
this claim, researchers have manipulated processing fluency using numerous
approaches, including semantic priming, phonological priming, or visual clar-
ity.29 The authors list an example of each type of study, and then go on
to argue that although each ‘manipulation influences a different proximal
cognitive system’, nonetheless, ‘all three studies found identical effects: Par-
ticipants rated fluent stimuli as more true or accurate than similar but less
fluent stimuli’.30
There are many ways of generating feelings of fluency or disfluency, be-
cause there are many aspects of engaging with a stimulus that can be com-
paratively easy or hard to do. Just in terms of reading a text, we gave the
example of how easy or hard a font may be to read, but also one could ma-
nipulate other visual aspects of a reading task, such as whether the letters
and the background contrast sharply or are in vexingly nearby shades of the
same hue.31 The words themselves could be more or less familiar, and the
concepts appealed to could be more or less abstruse. Outside of what one
might think of as belonging to the task of the reading proper, other aspects
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of the setting can make reading feel easier or harder, for example, if there are
distracting auditory stimuli as well.
So, the empirical literature is fairly clear at this point that the processing
fluency cue can increase how persuasive we find a text; and it can be trig-
gered by a wide range of manipulations. We need two more pieces in place,
to produce a debunking hypothesis for Plumerian believability. First, our
hypothesis will include that experiential believability is itself something that
is susceptible to this cue – that more fluency would mean, on average, more
experiential believability. This seems to us not much of a stretch, given the
sheer breadth of documented fluency effects, and that, again, we only need
our hypotheses to cross a bar of well-motivated empirical plausibility. So
we will simply conjecture that the experience of psychological believability is
indeed susceptible to fluency cues.
Second, even granting ourselves that connection, we still need to offer a
decent empirical reason to suspect that novels may be particularly susceptible
to this cue. Is there something about a novel, at least a well-written and,
indeed, believable one, that should lead us to predict it will score highly in
terms of fluency? Without this last piece, then even if the fluency cue could in
principle create illusions of increased believability, we wouldn’t have grounds
to suggest that such illusions could afflict the novels from which Plumer wants
us to extract transcendental arguments.
This last missing piece is provided by narrative. Expert novelists engineer
their plots to be engrossing, even transporting, and they have an array of tools
to bring about that effect.32 And not least among those tools is a well-crafted
plot that holds the reader’s attention without frustrating it. In their synopsis
of the literature, Vaughn et al. state that ‘[m]any models of narrative impact
posit that transportation is a key factor in narrative persuasion . . . . Studies
often show a positive relationship between transportation and subsequent
story-consistent attitudes and beliefs’.33 Through some clever experimental
manipulations, they found that in general, increasing the processing fluency
of a story even further intensified its persuasive power. The more fluent
our experience of reading the text, the more likely we are to agree with its
contents.34
Now, the reader may well object that novels from the postmodern or
even just late modern period typically frustrate the reader, and works such
as Finnegans Wake or Gravity’s Rainbow strike the reader as having been
exquisitely crafted to avoid any easy digestion. Yet we think this phenomenon
rather strengthens our case here, for such novels are not among the ones that
would rate highly in terms of psychological believability. Whatever we are to
take away from the adventures of Pynchon’s Tyrone Slothrop, our apprecia-
tion for the fine points of his psychology does not seem among them. Books
that are meant to be difficult will not generally be ones that provide possible
sources for a Plumerian transcendental argument. Among other books that
may be narratively shambolic, but still present as psychologically believable,
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we should also consider whether their authors have tapped into other sources
of fluency, such as clever writing and humour. (Tristram Shandy, perhaps?)
We thus have all of our pieces in position for this first debunking hypothe-
sis. Plumer claims that novels that occasion experiential believability must be
doing so because our minds really do work like they are shown to work in the
novels. Yet perhaps experiential believability is driven in no small part by our
processing fluency in reading the text, and that fluency is typically amplified
by all the tricks and tactics of the writer’s craft and genius, not least of all,
their capacity to spin a good, absorbing yarn. Even if sometimes great novels
will be experientially believable because they embody insights about human
cognition, sometimes they will be experientially believable simply because they
are great novels.
IV. DON’T BELIEVE EVERYTHING THAT SEEMS
BELIEVABLE: EXPLANATORY DEPTH
Our second debunking hypothesis challenges the move from a novel’s experi-
enced believability to viewing that novel as capturing truths of human nature.
For our second debunking hypothesis, we suggest that philosophers and lit-
erary critics, when they regard a work of fiction as expressing general truths
of human nature, may be in the grip of the illusion of explanatory depth.
The illusion of explanatory depth is a general tendency for people to feel
they understand the world better than they actually do. Rozenblit and Keil
have documented this tendency in subjects’ self-reported understanding of the
internal workings of artifacts and natural processes.35 And the effect can be
found when we deploy too-simple causal models not just in mechanical but in
psychological domains as well, such as the workings of public policy,36 belief
in conspiracy theories,37 and the workings of mental disorders.38 These stud-
ies elicit subjects’ self-reported understanding of causal mechanisms before
and after exposure to expert explanations of those mechanisms, consistently
finding that subjects were initially overconfident in their explanations.
Importantly, Rozenblit and Keil’s study found no evidence of overconfi-
dence in an understanding of narrative plots.39 They suggest this may be
due to different ways we represent narratives from how we represent causal
systems. Our mental representations of causal systems are low-fidelity and
miss many crucial components, which becomes increasingly likely as the sys-
tem’s internal complexity increases.40 In contrast, narratives are crafted, for
the most part, so that consumers can follow them. Some may be difficult to
follow, but they are rarely designed to be inscrutable (the probable likes of
Finnegans Wake and Gravity’s Rainbow excepted, as noted above). Whatever
features of our mental representations generate the illusion of understanding,
those features are not necessarily shared by our representation of narratives.
Rozenblit and Keil do not predict explanatory overconfidence across the
board, but they do expect it in the situations we are in as readers of psycho-
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logically rich novels. In their experiments, the strongest predictor of overcon-
fidence is a high ratio of visible to hidden parts in the thing explained. They
speculate that ‘the prominence of visible, transparent mechanisms may fool
people into believing that they have understood, and have successfully repre-
sented, what they have merely seen’.41 And while minds are complex mech-
anisms with causal components not available to immediate scrutiny, novels
wonderfully make many of those parts visible to the reader, and in a way that
can give a strong impression of ‘watching the gears turn’, as it were. The form
of the novel gives us intimate access to the minds of the characters by directly
representing their inner dialogue. It’s as if we are witnessing when one course
of action pivots on a fulcrum into a new behavioural direction, and can see
the mechanisms bringing about that change. In addition to our direct access
to their stream of consciousness, fictional characters’ minds have a neatness
to them missing in actual minds. Our minds are evolved biological systems, a
mess of kluges with many drives and motives hidden from scrutiny. Fictional
characters, in contrast, are made out primarily of words chosen by the au-
thor. The author may stipulate what her characters’ drives and motives are,
giving us access to them as well as to the character’s personal history as it
has shaped her motivational set. Through the novel’s lens, everything about
the character’s mind can be placed in our view.
To be clear, our suggestion is not that readers are overconfident in their
experience of understanding a character’s mind. A good author of the sort of
novels Plumer discusses will typically succeed in giving the attentive reader a
highly accurate sense of their creation’s psychology. Rather, the high ratio of
visible to hidden parts in the novel’s depiction of mental life primes readers
to have an illusory sense of understanding actual psychological reality on the
basis of their experience of the fiction. Much as Rozenblit and Keil’s sub-
jects are overconfident, when first pressed, that they understand a crossbow’s
workings, so, we suggest, are readers when they infer truths of human nature
from experienced believability.
But Rozenblit and Keil’s subjects recognise the simplicity of their mecha-
nistic models when offered an expert’s description of how a crossbow works.
For readers, it is not clear what counts as the ‘human nature expert’, of a sort
whose proposed account of actual human psychological working we would al-
low to trump our experiential, intuitive understanding as easily as the expert
in crossbows or bicycles or microwave ovens. After all, even highly success-
ful psychologists may be poor students of human nature as such – perhaps
possessing a deep grasp of this or that specific mechanism while missing the
larger picture – and expert observers of human nature may have a poor grasp
of those sub-personal processes that drive much of our behaviour.
Perhaps one might think the very best novelists come as close as anyone to
having expertise in human nature. Yet we should not uncritically treat their
novels as displaying that expertise. As Gregory Currie observes, novelists do
not solely pursue psychological verisimilitude in representing their characters.
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Their other goals include shaping characters to respond to dramatic necessity.
He writes, ‘a great deal of speculation and debate goes on about the extent
to which these characters are motivated from within – by plausibly human
models of deliberation and feeling – or from without, by dramatic necessity,
or poetic inclination, or the need to make the always difficult fourth act
work, or whatever’.42 Novelists simultaneously pursue all these aims at once,
making it impossible to fully untangle those parts of the fiction that aim at
proper psychological verisimilitude from those that don’t. Careful readers
and expert literary critics sometimes fail to reach any consensus on when one
aim is sacrificed for another; Currie cites the different positions Coleridge,
Empson, and Bradley adopt on the plausibility of Iago’s scheming malignity
as an example.43 Because we cannot fully untangle these aims, we shouldn’t
treat great novels, which tell great stories, as though they were performing
the task of explaining how minds work by highlighting a subset of causal
factors.44
The illusion of explanatory depth is one of many phenomena that chal-
lenge Plumer’s rationale for the RT. Recall that rationale: mindreading com-
petences become entrenched by serving human needs, and that they could not
do this unless those competences delivered predictions of human behaviour
that were ‘on the whole reflective of reality’.45 This view presumes our cog-
nitive capacities evolved to deliver increasingly reliable judgments about the
world. Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber offer an alternative story of how our
cognitive capacities became evolutionarily entrenched – a story that, while
compatible with the RT’s truth, leaves its truth an empirically open question.
On their ‘argumentative theory of reasoning’, cognitive mechanisms, includ-
ing mindreading capacities, evolved for ‘justifying oneself, and . . . producing
arguments to convince others’.46 Cognition in general, including mindreading
competences, they argue, developed for use in an interpersonal setting where
participants aimed at coordination and persuasion, with these aims often con-
flicting with that of truth-tracking. Mercier and Sperber’s framework predicts
a general ‘myside bias’ in reasoning towards justifications supporting the rea-
soner’s point of view.47 This bias is compatible with reasoners accounting for,
and changing their views in response to, counterevidence when it is presented.
But as a design principle of the mind, this bias predicts many of the quirks
in our representational and reasoning systems empirical psychologists have
recently uncovered, including the illusion of explanatory depth.48
Our second debunking hypothesis can stand (or fall) independent of Mercier
and Sperber’s argumentative theory of reasoning. But that theory, assuming
its truth, provides an alternative evolutionary rationale to the RT for why
many readers feel confident novels convey truths of human nature. We’ve
argued it is a live hypothesis that this feeling of confidence may often be
a product of the illusion of explanatory depth. While Mercier and Sperber
do not explicitly present it as such, the illusion of explanatory depth can
be construed as a manifestation of the general myside bias they describe.
47
Aesthetic Debunking and the Transcendental Argument of
the Novel
Overconfidence helps us sell ourselves to others in interpersonal contexts as
grasping a mechanism’s workings: thus we come off as well informed and
promising potential cooperative partners. Although reading is a solitary ac-
tivity, we propose that extracting general principles of human nature from
fiction activates our social tendency to ‘sell ourselves’ as knowledgeable. This
general disposition, which operates in us below the threshold of conscious
awareness, would have been fitness-enhancing for our ancestors, who never
experienced, even in communal storytelling sessions, anything like the rich
interiority of a great novel. The experience of believability may have less to
do with accessing an evolutionarily entrenched shared ‘set of fundamental as-
sumptions about human nature’ than with activating an atavistic tendency,
which misfires in a solitary context, to make ourselves look good to others.49
V. SOME LESSONS FOR A NATURALISTIC ACCOUNT OF
AESTHETIC EPISTEMOLOGY
We will conclude with two brief methodological lessons, and a highly specu-
lative suggestion.
First, we take ourselves to be reinforcing here a lesson that Currie in
particular has been interested in pressing upon the community of aesthet-
icians: namely, that the work of scientific psychology should give us serious
pause – should make us slam on the brakes, in fact – whenever we look to
transition from experienced psychological confidence to endorsed epistemic
credence about the nature of the mind. Samuel Johnson, Currie writes, ‘was
delightfully confident in his opinions of many things, and rated himself a great
observer of his fellow creatures’.50 Like Johnson, we generalise about human
nature with little more support for our claims than our own confidence in
their truth. Currie observes that this hardly seems a good epistemic practice
given ‘the last 50 years of psychological investigation’.51 Our arguments here
build on Currie’s observation.
Second, and relatedly, we would note that Plumer’s argument is at heart
an abductive one. He invites us to ask the question, what else could explain
our sense of believability in these works, if not their real, objective believabil-
ity? We take this to be a case study in the importance of letting the sciences
help guide our sense of what possible answers there could be to such a ‘what
else?’ question. To be clear, we are not objecting that Plumer’s own preferred
hypothesis is itself in any way unscientific. It is an empirical hypothesis in
good standing, and he musters various considerations that we agree should
motivate its consideration, such as his appeals to evolution. But it is a yet
further step, and a large one, from hypothesis to truth, and our concern is
that his inference to the truth of that one scientific hypothesis depends on
keeping other equally well-motivated scientific hypotheses out of view.
Finally, Peter Kivy was fond of emphasising the importance of attending
to the differences across different art forms, and avoiding overgeneralising
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about all of the arts on the basis of too narrow a sample.52 We will close by
speculating on the consequences for Plumer’s argument if we pan out from
novels of a psychologically rich type, and cut over to a different medium
altogether that may offer divergent psychological lessons. We concur with
Plumer’s critical observation that the greatest exemplars of such novels do, for
certain, give us a strong feeling of insight into the nature of their characters’
minds, and thereby into human psychology on the whole. Yet there are
other artworks, equally great in their own categories, that seem to offer a
contradictory lesson about the human mind: that we are all fundamentally
unknowable to each other. Cinema is an especially good vehicle for conveying
this sense of psychological opacity, as the medium does not give viewers direct
access to characters’ minds (setting aside the occasional use of voice-over).
Consider for example Vertigo’s Scottie, who is motivated by strange, all-
encompassing obsessions and passions that, while believable, are inscrutable
to the audience and, presumably, to the characters – including Scottie – in
the fictional world as well.53
If this observation upon cinema is correct, then at best, Plumer’s argument
would be transposed from the Kantian tune of the transcendental argument,
into a different and rather more minor key of the antinomy. If a masterwork
novel can teach us how we most fundamentally make sense to each other, and
at the same time, a brilliant film can teach us that we are fundamentally,
always already estranged from each other . . . then perhaps each kind of work
should serve as a reductio of the other, and we should abandon the idea of
learning through the arts.
And yet! Something does seem right, and deeply so, in all of these great
works, does it not? While our debunking arguments here should make plau-
sible the possibility that this seeming is delusional, nonetheless, we do not
at all think that such a conclusion is entailed by these arguments. We are
advocating that a naturalistic perspective on our aesthetic lives poses puzzles
about how to reconcile a scientific self-understanding with the kind of epis-
temic and aesthetic promises that the arts have seemed to make to us. There
is a tension between what the sciences tell us we are, and what the arts tell
us to hope for. We suspect that the best way forward is not to plump for
either side of that push-and-pull, but rather, to articulate a framework that
ultimately allows us to reside, even if not always entirely comfortably, within
that tension. Reckoning with Plumer’s transcendentally argumentative novels




Aesthetic Debunking and the Transcendental Argument of
the Novel
NOTES
1See, e.g., Lamarque and Olsen 1994 for
one classic interrogation.
2Plumer 2017.
3One should distinguish ‘realism’ as a
term for a literary style, from what Plumer
has in mind as synonymous with ‘being re-
alistic’, as in keeping true to the particu-
lars of the actual world. ‘Believable’, in
terms of psychological plausibility, cross-
cuts both, in that a genre with fantasti-
cal or science-fictional elements cannot be
considered realistic, in Plumer’s sense, al-
though it may or may not be believable.
And a work in the genre of ‘magic re-
alism’ will by definition not be realistic
sensu Plumer, yet typically its characters
act highly believably in the, to our eyes,








11He is particularly concerned that the
principles might be merely relative; see his
section 5.
12Ratcliffe 2006, 38, italics original.
13See also, e.g., Spaulding 2018 for an-
other picture of mindreading that may not
be amenable to PT, in particular her focus




17Morris 2017, 11, 28.
18Jones 2016.
19Gjesdal and Weinberg, forthcoming.
20Wood 2008, 69.
21E.g., Lee and Labroo 2004.
22Topolinski 2014.
23Cutting 2003; Oppenheimer 2008.
24Meskin et al. 2013, and Liao, Meskin,
and Fletcher 2020.
25Reber, Schwarz, and Winkielman
2004.
26Experiences of fluency can also serve
directly as inputs into the contents of judg-
ments themselves. For example, turning
up the fluency can turn down our evalua-
tion of the moral wrongness of a transgres-
sion (Laham, Alter, and Goodwin 2009).
And there is at least some evidence that it
can shift our attributions of when an agent
performs a free action, where an easier sce-
nario to think about yields an increased
rating of how easily an agent could have
done otherwise – even when the fluency
manipulation is something utterly inciden-
tal to the scenario’s content, like choice of
font (Weinberg et al. 2012). But we will be
more interested here in the metacognitive
use of the cue, to treat a message or source
as more credible, than in its potential role
as a first-order heuristic in the content of
a judgment.
27McGlone and Tofighbakhsh 2000.
28Schwarz 2004, 338.
29Alter and Oppenheimer 2009, 219-220.
30Alter and Oppenheimer 2009, 220.
A recent paper suggests a different role
for this variety of cue, in which a feel-
ing of disfluency could lead participants
to be more attentive and reflective, more
likely to pick up on subtle errors than
those who were experiencing a task more
fluently. These results would suggest
that disfluency could lead to greater cog-
nitive accuracy (Hyunjin and Schwarz
2008; Diemand-Yauman, Oppenheimer,
and Vaughan 2011). Unfortunately, it
seems that these findings have not repli-
cated well (Kühl and Eitel 2016). To our
knowledge, however, there have not been
similar replication concerns raised about
the main mechanism we are relying on in
our arguments here, to the effect that a
greater feeling of fluency could lead to a
greater sense of believability.
31Reber and Schwarz 1999
32One trick is using the environment as
an ‘objective correlative’ to create a gen-
eral atmosphere expressing characters’ in-
ner states. Consider Dickens’ use of the
thick London fog in Bleak House to empha-
sise the characters’ moral corruption and
confusion. Or, switching to plays, Shake-
speare’s use of the storm in King Lear to
capture Lear’s inner state. These meta-
phorical devices, we suspect, aid process-
ing and enhance characters’ believability
by giving us environmental cues to their
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psychological states, making those states
creep out from the characters’ minds into
the atmosphere itself.
33Leigh et al. 2010, 1183.
34We should caution that we have, of ne-
cessity, presented a rather simplified pic-
ture of this corner of the empirical liter-
ature. There is a long and varied set of
interactions that can complicate the effect
of different manipulations. For example,
somewhat akin to the Meskin et al. find-
ing about mere exposure to bad art, it
looks like unsuccessful stories can be made
even less transporting by increasing flu-
ency. Basically, the increased fluency ap-
pears to make readers more confident in
their judgments that the stories are not so
good, and leads them to disengage. See
Leigh et al. 2010, 1188.
35Rozenblit and Keil 2002.
36Fernbach et al. 2013.
37Vitriol and Marsh 2018.
38Zeveney and Marsh 2016.
39Rozenblit and Keil 2002, 543-544.
40Rozenblit and Keil 2002, 555-557.





46Mercier and Sperber 2017, 8.
47Mercier and Sperber 2017, 220.




52As in, e.g., his Kivy 1993 ‘Differences’.
53For a general discussion of these issues
in Hitchcock’s films, see Pippin 2017.
54The work is the equal responsibility of
the co-authors, and author order is alpha-
betical.
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